Bandit problems with Levy payoff processes by Cohen, Asaf & Solan, Eilon
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
08
35
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
4 J
un
 20
09
BANDIT PROBLEMS WITH LE´VY PAYOFF PROCESSES
ASAF COHEN AND EILON SOLAN
Abstract. We study two-armed Le´vy bandits in continuous-time, which have
one safe arm that yields a constant payoff s, and one risky arm that can be
either of type High or Low; both types yield stochastic payoffs generated by
a Le´vy process. The expectation of the Le´vy process when the arm is High is
greater than s, and lower than s if the arm is Low.
The decision maker (DM) has to choose, at any given time t, the fraction of
resource to be allocated to each arm over the time interval [t, t+dt). We show
that under proper conditions on the Le´vy processes, there is a unique optimal
strategy, which is a cut-off strategy, and we provide an explicit formula for the
cut-off and the optimal payoff, as a function of the data of the problem. We
also examine the case where the DM has incorrect prior over the type of the
risky arm, and we calculate the expected payoff gained by a DM who plays
the optimal strategy that corresponds to the incorrect prior.
In addition, we study two applications of the results: (a) we show how to
price information in two-armed Le´vy bandit problem, and (b) we investigate
who fares better in two-armed bandit problems: an optimist who assigns to
High a probability higher than the true probability, or a pessimist who assigns
to High a probability lower than the true probability.
1. Introduction
Consider a firm that has to determine, on an ongoing basis, how much to invest
in the research of new technologies for its next line of products. The firm faces
a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation: on the one hand, it can adopt
the technology that seems most successful according to the research conducted
so far, thereby exploiting its investment in research, but on the other hand, it
could continue investing in various technologies, in the hope of finding an even
better technology for its products. If the firm decides to stop investing in a given
technology, then no information will be obtained on that technology, so even if it
is actually better than the finally adopted technology, it will never be adopted.
A similar tradeoff between exploration and exploitation arises, e.g., in the market
of venture capital funds, where each fund has to decide in which start-up companies
to invest, and in clinical trials, where pharmaceutical companies have to decide
which new drugs or treatments to explore.
To concentrate on the trade off between exploration and exploitation, one as-
sumes that there are no exogenous factors that affect the firm’s decision (such as
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new technologies or drugs that are introduced by competitors). The optimization
problem that the firm faces has been modeled in the literature as a multi-arm ban-
dit problem (see, e.g., Rothschild (1974), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006), Keller,
Rady and Cripps (2005), Besanko andWu (2008), Klein and Rady (2008), Moscarini
and Squintani (2004), Roberts and Weitzman (1981), Weitzman (1979)): a decision
maker (DM) has finitely many actions, called arms, each one yields a payoff with an
unknown distribution, that is taken from a finite set of distributions. Each time the
DM chooses an arm, he obtains a payoff, and improves his information regarding
the correct payoff distribution of the arm he has just chosen.
Gittins and Jones (1979) proved that, in discrete-time, the optimal strategy of
the DM has a particularly simple form: at every period the DM calculates a real
number, an index, for each arm, based on past observations of that arm, and he
chooses the arm with the highest index. It turns out that to calculate the index
of an arm it is sufficient to consider an auxiliary problem with two arms: the arm
for which we calculate the index, and an arm that yields a constant payoff. The
literature therefore focuses on such problems, called two-armed bandit problems.
Once the optimality of the index strategy is guaranteed, one looks for the relation
between that data of the game and the index. Explicit formulas for the index when
the payoff is one of two distributions that have a simple form has been established
in the literature. Berry and Friestedt (1985) provide the solution to the problem in
discrete-time, e.g., when the payoff distribution is one of two Bernoulli distributions,
and in continuous-time, e.g., when the payoff distribution is one of two Brownian
motions. In continuous-time, by studying the dynamic programming equation that
describes the problem, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2008)
provided an explicit form for the index when the payoff’s distribution is Poisson.1
When the payoff distribution is known, Karatzas (1984) characterized the index
when the payoff’s distribution is a diffusion process, and Kaspi and Mandelbaum
(1995) characterized the index when the payoff’s distribution is a Le´vy process, and
they obtained an explicit form for the index for special distributions.
In practice, payoff processes have a complex form, exhibiting both small random
changes, that can be modeled by a Brownian motion, and large shocks that can be
modeled as arriving at a Poisson rate. A stochastic process that incorporates these
two types of changes is the Le´vy process. In fact, Carr and Wu (2004) argue that
almost all economic phenomena can be described by time shifts of Le´vy processes.
Therefore, it is desirable to study the bandit problem where the payoff distribution
is one of finitely many Le´vy distributions.
In the present paper we provide an explicit solution to the two-armed bandit
problem where the payoff distribution is one of two Le´vy processes. We assume
that one distribution, called High, dominates the other, called Low, in a strong
sense (see Assumption 2.1 below). To eliminate trivial cases, we assume that the
expected payoff that is generated by the safe arm is lower than the expected payoff
generated by the High distribution, and higher than the expected payoff generated
by the Low distribution.
In such a case in discrete-time, the optimal strategy is a cut-off strategy: the
DM keeps on experimenting as long as the posterior belief that the distribution is
1These authors also studied the strategic setup, in which several DMs have the same set of
arms, and their arms’ payoff distributions are the same (and unknown), and they compared the
cooperative solution to the non-cooperative solution.
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High is higher than some cut-off point, and, once the posterior probability that the
distribution is High falls below the cut-off point, the DM switches to the safe arm.
We prove that when the two payoff distributions are Le´vy processes that satisfy
several requirements, the optimal strategy is a cut-off strategy, and we provide an
explicit expression for the cut-off point, in terms of the data of the problem. When
particularized to the models studied by Kaspi and Mandelbaum (1995), Bolton
and Harris (1999), Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2008),
our expression reduces to the expressions that they obtained.
Apart of unifying previous results, our characterization shows that the special
form of the optimal payoff derived by Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady
and Cripps (2005) is valid in a general setup: the optimal payoff is the sum of the
expected payoff if no information is available, and of an option value, that measures
the expected gain from the ability to experiment. It also shows that the data of the
problem can be divided into information-relevant parameters and payoff-relevant
parameters; the information-relevant parameters can be summarized in a single real
number, and the payoff-relevant parameters are the expectations of the processes
that contribute to the DM’s payoff. Finally, the characterization allows one to
derive comparative statics on the optimal cut-off and payoff. For example, as the
discount rate increases, or the signals become less informative, the cut-off point
increases but the DM’s optimal payoff decreases.
It is often the case that the DM holds an incorrect prior, and plays optimally
given that prior (for further discussion and literature review, see Section 2.4). We
provide an explicit expression for the value function in this case. Our technique
provides a new description of the optimal strategy with a time dependent cut-off.
So far we have assumed that all the information that the DM has is the payoff
process. Sometimes, the DM has information that does not contribute to the payoff
process, yet it helps him learn the type of risky arm. For example, scientific discov-
eries made by other firms in other markets may shed light on the appropriateness
of a given technology to a product that a firm develops. In addition, part of the
payoff of the DM may not be observed by the DM.
In Section 2.5 we study a bandit problem, in which the risky arm generates three
Le´vy processes - the first is observed by the DM and contributes to the payoff, the
second is observed by the DM and does not contribute to the payoff, and the third
is not observed by the DM but it contributes to the payoff. We provide an explicit
expression for the cut-off and for the optimal payoff of the DM. That generalizes the
expression we found when the risky arm generates only one process. This analysis
clarifies the distinction between information-relevant data and payoff-relevant data.
We conclude the paper by applying our characterization to compare the effects
of optimism and pessimism in bandit problems. A DM is called optimist if his prior
probability that the payoff’s distribution is High is higher than the true probability,
and he is called a pessimist if his prior probability that the payoff’s distribution
is High is lower than the true probability. Using our characterization we find that
unless the pessimist assigns high probability to the High type and the two DM’s
are sufficiently patient, an optimist will fare better than a pessimist.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The model and the main results
appear in Section 2. Directions for future research appear in Section 3. All proofs
appear in Section 4.
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2. the model and the main results
2.1. Reminder about Le´vy Processes. Le´vy processes are the continuous-time
analog of discrete-time random walks with i.i.d. increments. A Le´vy process
X = (X(t))t≥0 is a continuous-time stochastic process that (a) starts at the origin:
X(0) = 0, (b) admits ca`dla`g modification,2 and (c) has stationary independent
increments. See figures 1 and 2 for a generic path of a Le´vy process. A few exam-
ples of Le´vy processes are a Brownian motion, a Poisson process, and a compound
Poisson process. The latter is a continuous-time process in which jumps arrive
according to a Poisson process and the jumps are i.i.d.3
We now present the Le´vy-Ito decomposition of Le´vy processes. Let (X(t)) be a
Le´vy process. For every Borel measurable set A ⊆ R\{0}, define:
ν(A) := E [♯{0 ≤ s ≤ 1|∆X(t) := X(t)−X(t−) ∈ A}] .
This is the expected number of jumps with size in A that occurs up to time 1.
One can verify that ν is a measure, called the Le´vy measure of the process. The
quantity ν(R\{0}) is the expected number of jumps that occur up to time 1. If
ν(R\{0}) =∞, then the number of jumps in the time interval [0, 1], and therefore
in any compact time interval, is infinite a.s., and we say that the Le´vy measure is
infinite. If ν(R\{0}) <∞, then the expected number of jumps in any compact time
interval is finite a.s., and we say that the Le´vy measure is finite. In this paper we
study Le´vy processes that have finite Le´vy measures. The results can be generalized
for Le´vy processes with infinite Le´vy measures, see Cohen and Solan (2009).
The Le´vy-Ito decomposition (see Applebaum (2004)) states that every Le´vy
process with finite Le´vy measure can be represented as follows:
(2.1) X(t) = µt+ σZ(t) + Lν(t),
where µt is a linear drift, σZ(t) is a Brownian motion with standard deviation σ,
and Lν(t) is a compound Poisson process with Le´vy measure ν which is indepen-
dent of σZ(t): jumps arrive at a Poisson rate with expectation ν(R\{0}), and the
distribution of each jump is given by the distribution function ν(dh)ν(R\{0}) .
2.2. Le´vy Bandits. A DM operates a two-armed bandit machine in continuous-
time, with a safe arm that yields a constant payoff s, and a risky arm that yields
a stochastic payoff (X(t)). The risky arm can be of two types, High or Low.
We denote the arm’s type by θ: if the type is High (resp. Low) we set θ = θ1
(resp. θ2). If θ = θi, i ∈ {1, 2}, the risky arm yields payoff (Xi(t)), which is a
Le´vy process. We assume throughout that the Le´vy measures of both (X1(t)) and
(X2(t)) are finite, and therefore a.s. there are only finitely many jumps in each
compact time interval. Denote the Le´vy-Ito decomposition of (Xi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2},
by Xi(t) = µit+ σiZ(t) + Lνi(t).
2That is, it is continuous from the right, and has limits from the left: for every t0, the limit
X(t0−) := lim
tրt0
X(t) exists a.s. and X(t0) = lim
tցt0
X(t).
3Formally, let λ > 0, and let D be a distribution over R\{0}. A compound Poisson process with
rate λ and jump size distributionD is a continuous-time stochastic process given byX(t) =
N(t)P
i=1
Di,
where N(t) is a Poisson process with rate λ, and Di are i.i.d. random variables, with distribution
function D, which are also independent of (N(t))t≥0 .
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Set ν¯i := νi(R \ {0}), and denote by Hi :=
∫
hνi(dh)/ν¯i the expected jump size
of (Xi(t)).
4 We assume that Hi is finite. The quantity
∫
hνi(dh) = ν¯iHi is the
contribution of the compound Poisson process to the instantaneous payoff. The
expectation of the risky arm at time t = 1 if θ = θi is gi := E[Xi(1)] = ν¯iHi + µi.
Throughout we make the following assumption, which states that the High type
is better than the Low type in a strong sense.
Assumption 2.1.
A1. −∞ < g2 < s < g1 <∞.
A2. σ1 = σ2.
A3. For every A ∈ B(R \ {0}), ν2(A) ≤ ν1(A) <∞.
Assumptions A1 and A2 rule out trivial cases. Assumption A1 merely says that
the High (resp. Low) type provides higher (resp. lower) expected payoff than the
safe arm. Assumption A2 states that the Brownian motion component of both the
High type and Low type have the same standard deviation. Otherwise, since the
realized path reveals the standard deviation, the DM can distinguish between the
arms in any infinitesimal time interval.
The third part of the assumption is less innocuous; it requires that the Le´vy
measure of the High type will dominate the Le´vy measure of the Low type in a
strong sense: roughly, jumps of any size h occur more often (or at the same rate)
under the high type than under the Low type.
A consequence of this assumption is that jumps always provide good news, and
(weakly) increase the posterior probability of the High type.
At each time instance t, the DM chooses the proportion of time to devote to
each of the two arms. If he chooses to devote a proportion k of the current time
instance to the risky arm, then the instantaneous payoff dY k is the sum of several
terms:
• (1 − k)sdt, which is the contribution of the safe arm;
• kµidt, which is the contribution of the linear drift;
• √kσdZ(t), which is the contribution of the Brownian motion;5
• kHidt, which is the contribution of the compound Poisson process.
A strategy κ is a (measurable) function, that assigns to each history a number in
the interval [0, 1], that is interpreted as the amount of time in the interval [t, t+dt)
devoted to the risky arm. In continuous time, it is usually assumed that a strategy
is predictable, that is, to determine the behavior at time t, it is sufficient to know
the history strictly before time t. Formally, κt is FIt−-measurable, where I(t) :=∫ t
0
re−rtdY κ(t) is the stochastic discounted payoff using the strategy κ, and FIt−
is the σ-algebra generated by the stochastic process (I(t)) of the discounted payoff
with discount rate r, up to (excluding) time t.
As is well known , in continuous-time the play path need not be uniquely defined,
and therefore one should be careful in defining the set of strategies available to the
DM, and the play path that a strategy defines. We circumvent this issue by arguing
that an optimal strategy must solve a certain Functional Differential Equation
4In order to simplify notation, we denote
R
hνi(dh) :=
R
R\{0}
hνi(dh).
5By devoting the proportion κ of the time interval [t, t + dt) to the risky arm, the variance
of the continuous part of the payoff is κσ2dt. This explains the scaling parameter
√
kσ. For a
qualitative explanation for this form, see Bolton and Harris (1999).
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(FDE), by showing that this FDE has a unique solution, and by exhibiting this
solution. As for discrete-time, this solution turns out to be a cut-off strategy,
which we now define.
Let pt := P (θ = θ1|FIt−) be the posterior belief at time t that the risky arm is
High. A strategy κ is a cut-off strategy with cut-off point p if the DM chooses the
safe arm (with probability 1) whenever pt ≤ p, and the risky arm (with probability
1) whenever pt > p. We now argue that Assumption A3 guarantees that the play
under a cut-off strategy is well defined. Suppose that p0 > p. Then the DM chooses
the risky arm until the first time t that satisfies pt = p. Since the Le´vy payoff
processes have finite measures, Assumption A3 implies that in an infinitesimal
interval after time t the posterior belief will drop below the cut-off. Indeed, the
first time t satisfying pt = p is a predictable stopping time, and therefore, the
probability that a jump occurs atthat time is zero (see Bertoin (1996)). Therefore,
P (θ = θ1|FIt ) = P (θ = θ1|FIt−) = p. If there is a Brownian motion component, its
fluctuations will cause the posterior to drop below p in an infinitesimal time interval
after time t. If there is no Brownian motion component, since the Le´vy measure
is finite, there are no jumps in an infinitesimal time interval, and by Assumption
A3 the compound Poisson process will cause the posterior to drop below p. This
implies that the play under a cut-off strategy is well defined.
2.3. The Optimal Strategy. The expected discounted payoff under a strategy κ
when the prior is p0 = p is
Vκ(p) = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtdY κ(t)
]
= pE
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtdY κ(t)
∣∣∣∣ θ1
]
+ (1− p)E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtdY κ(t)
∣∣∣∣ θ2
]
.
Let U(p) = sup
κ
Vκ(p) be the maximal payoff the DM can achieve. As we show
below, the DM has an optimal strategy, so in fact the supremum in the definition
of U(p) is achieved. The function Vκ(p) is linear with respect to p, and therefore
U(p), as the supremum of linear functions, is convex. By always choosing the safe
arm, the DM can achieve at least s; since U(0) = s, the convexity of U(p) implies
that U is non-decreasing.
Proposition 2.2. U(p) is monotone non-decreasing, convex, and continuous in p.
It follows from Proposition 2.2 that there is p∗ such that U(p) = s if p ≤ p∗ and
U(p) > s otherwise, so that the strategy κ ≡ 0 that always chooses the safe arm is
optimal for prior beliefs in [0, p∗].
Our first theorem states that there is a unique optimal strategy, which is a cut-off
strategy. Moreover it provides the exact cut-off point and the corresponding ex-
pected payoff in terms of the data of the problem. Let α be the unique solution
of
(2.2) f(η) :=
∫
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+η(ν¯1−ν¯2)−ν¯2+1
2
(η+1)η
(
µ1 − µ2
σ
)2
−r = 0
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in (0,∞). The existence and uniqueness of such a solution are proved in Lemma 4.4
below. Observe that ν2(dh)ν1(dh) , the Radon-Nikodym derivative, exists by Assumption
A3.6
Theorem 2.3. Denote p∗ := α(s−g2)(α+1)(g1−s)+α(s−g2) . Under Assumptions A1-A3, the
unique optimal strategy is
κ∗ =
{
0 if p ≤ p∗,
1 if p > p∗.
The expected payoff under κ∗ is
(2.3) U(p) = Vκ∗(p) =
{
s if p ≤ p∗,
pg1 + (1− p)g2 + Cα(1 − p)(1−pp )α if p > p∗,
where Cα =
s−g2−p∗(g1−g2)
(1−p∗)( 1−p∗p∗ )
α .
The term pg1 + (1− p)g2 in (2.3) is the expected payoff for a DM choosing only
the risky arm. Thus, Cα(1−p)(1−pp )α is the option value for the ability to switch to
the safe arm. The quantity α summarizes all the information-relevant parameters
of the problem (see also Section 2.5). Apart from that, the parameters of the payoff
processes that determine the cut-off point p∗ and the optimal payoff U(p) are the
expected payoffs g1 and g2.
The function in (2.3) has the same structure as the solution of Bolton and
Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) for the one agent problem.
In Bolton and Harris (1999), the only component in the risky arm is the Brow-
nian motion with drift. Therefore νi ≡ 0, so that g1 = µ1, g2 = µ2, and
α = (−1 +
√
1 + 8rσ2/(µ1 − µ2)2)/2. In Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), the
risky arm is either the constant zero (Low type, so that ν2 ≡ 0), or yields a pay-
off h¯ according to a Poisson process with rate λ (High type). If the risky arm is
High, the only component in the Le´vy-Ito decomposition is the compound Poisson
component, and ν1(h¯) = λ and zero otherwise. Therefore, g1 = λh¯, g2 = 0, and
α = r/λ.
The explicit form of the cut-off point p∗ and of the value function U allows us
to derive simple comparative statics. As is well known, a DM who plays optimally
switches to the safe arm later than a myopic DM, and indeed, p∗ is smaller than
the myopic cut-off point pm := s−g2g1−g2 . Furthermore, the cut-off point p
∗ is an
increasing function of α. As can be expected, α (and therefore also p∗) increases
at the discount rate r and at ν2(dh), and it decreases at ν1(dh) and at |µ1 − µ2|:
the DM switches to the safe arm earlier as the discount rate increases, as jumps
provide less information, or as the difference between the drifts of the two types
increases.7 Furthermore, as long as p > p∗, the value function U(p) decreases in
α. Thus, decreasing the discount rate, increasing the informativeness of the jumps
and the difference between the drifts is beneficial to the DM.
6To ensure the existence of the Radon-Nikodym derivative, and therefore the form of the
solution, one does not need the full power of Assumption A3. Its full power will be used within
the proof.
7Moreover, α(r = 0) = 0 and α(r =∞) =∞.
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In Section 2.4 we extend the results to the case that the prior belief of the DM
is not the true prior p0. In Sections 2.6 and 2.5 we provide two applications to our
techniques and results.
Remark 2.4. Incomplete information of p0. Suppose that the DM does not
know the prior belief p0, but rather has some belief ϕ over p0. That is, p0 is
chosen at the outset according to ϕ, and is not told to the DM. From the DM’s
point of view, the situation is equivalent to an auxiliary problem in which the prior
probability of the High type is the expectation of the corresponding probability in
the original problem, and therefore Theorem 2.3 provides the optimal strategy in
this case as well.
2.4. The Payoff with Incorrect Prior. In decision problems it is usually as-
sumed that the DM either knows the true state of nature, or has some prior distri-
bution over the set of states of nature. Experiments show that the prior distribution
that DMs have is often different than the true prior. The phenomenon of overcon-
fidence – assigning too high a probability to the good state of nature – has been
observed in various areas (Svenson (1981), Baumhart (1968), Larwood and Whit-
taker (1977), Cross (1977), Weinstein (1980), Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). Bab-
cock and Loewenstein (1997) argue that biases in bargaining may be self-serving,
and Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2007) show that biases of preferences may be
stable.
In every decision problem, a DM who correctly perceives the prior distribution
will fare better than a DM who has some bias, and believes that the prior dis-
tribution is different than the correct one. Indeed, an optimal strategy of a DM
who correctly perceives the prior distribution is a strategy that yields the highest
possible gains for this prior distribution, so it yields at least as much as any other
strategy, in particular, optimal strategies for incorrect prior distributions.
Denote the initial belief of the DM for the High type by q0, and suppose that
it may be different from the true probability p0. By Theorem 2.3, the optimal
strategy of the DM is a cut-off strategy, however, since he has an incorrect prior,
he does not switch to the safe arm at the optimal time. In this section we give
an exact formula for the payoff, assuming the DM plays optimally given his belief.
We will also describe the optimal strategy from a different point of view, not as a
cut-off strategy. This point of view is arguably closer to the way people perceive
the decision problem that the DM faces.
Suppose that until time t, the DM chose the risky arm, and observed the
jumps h1, ...hn from the compound Poisson component of the payoff process. Let
Y 1B(t) be the Brownian motion with drift component of the payoff process from
the risky arm at time t. Note that Y 1B(t) ∼ N(µt, σ2t). The posterior belief
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qt := Pt(θ1|h1, ...hn;Y 1B(t); q0) of the DM is:8
qt =
q0
1√
2πtσ
e−
(Y 1
B
(t)−µ1t)2
2σ2t e−ν¯1t
∏
t− ν1(dhj)
q0
1√
2πtσ
e−
(Y 1
B
(t)−µ1t)2
2σ2t e−ν¯1t
∏
t− ν1(dhj) + (1− q0) 1√2πtσ e
− (Y
1
B
(t)−µ2t)2
2σ2t e−ν¯2t
∏
t− ν2(dhj)
(2.4)
=
q0e
µ1Y
1
B(t)/σ
2−µ21t/2σ2e−ν¯1t
∏
t− ν1(dhj)
q0eµ1Y
1
B
(t)/σ2−µ21t/2σ2e−ν¯1t
∏
t− ν1(dhj) + (1 − q0)eµ2Y
1
B
(t)/σ2−µ22t/2σ2e−ν¯2t
∏
t− ν2(dhj)
.
Indeed, 1√
2πtσ
e−
(Y 1B (t)−µit)
2
2σ2t is the probability of receiving the payoff Y 1B(t), given the
type θi, and e
−ν¯it (ν¯it)n
n!
∏
t−
νi(dhj)
ν¯i
is the probability of receiving the n jumps that
occurred until time t, given the type θi. The first equality in (2.4) is the Bayesian
belief updating, using the independence of the components in the Le´vy-Ito decom-
position, given the type of the risky arm, and the second equality is obtained by
eliminating common components. For a generic path of the process (qt), see figure
3.
Suppose the DM follows a cut-off strategy κ′ with cut-off point p′:
κ′ =
{
0 if p ≤ p′,
1 if p > p′.
If q0 ≤ p′, the DM will always choose the safe arm. If q0 > p′, the DM will
initially choose the risky arm. The DM chooses the risky arm as long as qt > p
′,
which, by Eq. (2.4), is equivalent to:
(2.5)
q0e
µ1Y
1
B(t)/σ
2−µ21t/2σ2−ν¯1t
(1 − q0)eµ2Y 1B(t)/σ2−µ22t/2σ2−ν¯2t
∏
t−
ν1(dh)
ν2(dh)
>
p′
1− p′ .
Without loss of generality assume that µ1−µ2 > 0; the case µ1−µ2 < 0 is handled
similarly, and provides the same results. By taking the natural logarithm, and
rearranging the resulting terms, we obtain that this inequality is equivalent to:
1
σ
Y 1B(t) >
[(
µ1 + µ2
2σ
)
+
σ(ν¯1 − ν¯2)
µ1 − µ2
]
t− σ
µ1 − µ2 ×
[
ln
(
q0
1− q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1− p′
)](2.6)
− σ
µ1 − µ2
∑
t−
ln
(
ν1(dhj)
ν2(dhj)
)
.
The right-hand side in (2.6) is a piecewise linear function F · t−E−Gt of t, where
the slope F :=
(
µ1+µ2
2σ
)
+ σ(ν¯1−ν¯2)µ1−µ2 is independent of t, the intercept at t = 0 is
E := σµ1−µ2 ×
[
ln
(
q0
1−q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1−p′
)]
, and Gt :=
σ
µ1−µ2
∑
t− ln
(
ν1(dhj)
ν2(dhj)
)
. Denote
by Gh :=
σ
µ1−µ2 ln
(
ν1(dh)
ν2(dh)
)
the contribution of a jump of size h to the intercept.
8Q
t− νi(dhj) is the product of νi(dhj) over all jumps hj that occur up to time t−. Similarly,
we use the notation
P
t− for the sum over all jumps up to time t−.
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From Eq. (2.6) we obtain the following alternative description of the optimal
strategy: The DM has a time-dependent cut-off which is piecewise linear. The
slope of the cut-off function is always F , and whenever there is a jump of size h,
the cut-off decreases by Gh (see Figure 4). The DM chooses the risky arm as long
as his current payoff from the continuous part of the Le´vy process, Y 1B(t), exceeds
the cut-off.
Thus, at first the DM plays until the payoff from the continuous part divided
by the standard deviation satisfies: 1σY
1
B(t) ≤ F · t − E; if a jump of size h occurs
before he switches to the safe arm, then the intercept decreases by Gh, and this
behavior repeats itself. If there is no Brownian motion component, then Y 1B(t) ≡ 0
and F = 0; the DM chooses the risky arm for a fixed amount of time, and then
switches to the safe arm, unless a jump occurs before the switch; if a jump occurred,
the amount of time to choose the risky arm increases, as a function of ν1(dh)ν2(dh) .
Theorem 2.5. Under Assumption 2.1, for every p0 ∈ [0, 1], the payoff U(p0, q0)
of a DM who uses a cut-off strategy with cut-off point p′, is as follows:9 if q0 ≥ p′,
U(p0, q0) = (s− g1)p0
(
1− q0
q0
)α+1(
p′
1− p′
)α+1
+ (s− g2)(1− p0)
(
1− q0
q0
)α(
p′
1− p′
)α(2.7)
+ g1p0 + g2(1− p0),
while U(p0, q0) = s if q0 < p
′.
One can verify that when the DM holds the correct prior, and plays according
to the optimal strategy κ∗, Eq. (2.7) coincides with (2.3): U(p0, p0) = U(p0). Note
that U(p0, q0) is continuous in all its parameters.
To calculate the payoff of a DM who plays optimally but has an incorrect prior,
simply substitute the expression for p∗ from Theorem 2.3 as p′ in Theorem 2.5.
2.5. Information and Payoff. Theorems 2.3 and 2.5 express the optimal cut-off,
the optimal expected payoff, and the expected payoff for a DM with incorrect prior
who uses a cut-off strategy in terms of the expected payoff of each arm, and the
quantity α, which captures all the information-relevant parameters of the payoff
processes. In this section we justify why α indeed captures all the information-
relevant parameters. This justification explains why the solutions of Bolton and
Harris (1995) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) have the same structure as our
solution. Suppose the DM faces a two-armed bandit problem with Le´vy payoffs. If
the risky arm’s type is High (resp. Low), it yields three independent Le´vy processes
(Xa1 (t)), (X
b
1(t)), (X
c
1(t)) (resp. (X
a
2 (t)), (X
b
2(t)), (X
c
2(t))).
As in Section 2.2, the notation µji , σ
j
i , ν
j
i , and g
j
i , represents the drift of the pro-
cess (Xji (t)), the standard deviation of the Brownian motion component of (X
j
i (t)),
the Le´vy measure of the process (Xji (t)), and the expectation of the process (X
j
i (t))
at time t = 1, respectively, where j ∈ {a, b, c}, and i ∈ {1, 2} is the arm’s type.
We assume that Assumption 2.1 is satisfied for the three couples ((Xj1(t)),
(Xj2(t))), j ∈ {a, b, c}.
9We omit the dependence of U on p′, s, g1, g2. Recall that α is the unique solution of the
equation f(η) = 0 (see Eq. (4.4)).
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Suppose that the DM’s payoff is Xai + X
c
i , while his information is (X
a
i , X
b
i ).
Thus, the component Xai represents observed information of the DM that con-
tributes to his payoff, the component Xbi represents observed information that does
not contribute to the payoff, and the component Xci represents unobserved infor-
mation that contributes to the payoff. The following theorem characterizes the
optimal strategy of the DM in this setup, as well as his expected payoff when he
holds a possibly incorrect prior. This characterization can be used to calculate the
fair price of additional information.
Let β be the unique solution of
fa,b(η) : =
∫
νa2 (dh
a)
(
νa2 (dh
a)
νa1 (dh
a)
)η
+ η(ν¯a1 − ν¯a2 )− ν¯a2 +
1
2
(η + 1)η
(
µa1 − µa2
σa
)2(2.8)
+
∫
νb2(dh
b)
(
νb2(dh
b)
νb1(dh
b)
)η
+ η(ν¯b1 − ν¯b2)− ν¯b2 +
1
2
(η + 1)η
(
µb1 − µb2
σb
)2
− r = 0
in (0,∞).
Theorem 2.6. The expected payoff to a DM who holds the prior belief q0, uses
a cut-off strategy κ′ with cut-off point p′, receives and observes the payoff process
(Xa(t)), observes but does not receive the payoff process (Xb(t)), and receives but
does not observe the payoff process (Xc(t)), is as follows: if q0 > p
′
V a,b,cp′ (p0, q0) : = (s− ga1 − gc1)p0
(
1− q0
q0
)β+1(
p′
1− p′
)β+1
+ (s− ga2 − gc2)(1− p0)
(
1− q0
q0
)β (
p′
1− p′
)β
+ p0(g
a
1 + g
c
1) + (1− p0)(ga2 + gc2),
while V a,b,cp′ (p0, q0) = s if q0 ≤ p′.
Moreover, the optimal cut-off for a DM who holds the correct prior, i.e. q0 = p0,
is given by
p∗ =
β(s− ga2 − gc2)
(β + 1)(ga1 + g
c
1 − s) + β(s− ga2 − gc2)
.
Observe that if there are no processes (Xbi , X
c
i ), then Theorem 2.6 reduces to
Theorem 2.5. Moreover, the parameter β in Theorem 2.6 is the equivalent of α in
Theorem 2.5.
The characterization in Theorem 2.6 shows that β incorporates all the data that
is relevant to the information that the DM has. It depends on the parameters of
(Xai , X
b
i ), which the DM observes, but not on the parameters of (X
c
i ), which the
DM does not observe. Moreover, it depends on the absolute value of the difference
between the drifts, |µ1 − µ2|, the standard deviation of the Brownian motion, σ,
the Radon-Nikodym derivative ν2(dh)ν1(dh) , and the average ην¯1 + (1 − η)ν¯2. These
quantities help in distinguishing between the two types of the Risky arm. Once the
information-relevant parameters are summarized in β, the only relevant parameters,
which affect both the optimal cut-off and the optimal expected payoff, are the
expectations of the payoff-relevant processes (gai , g
c
i ).
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Theorem 2.6 can be used to find the fair price of the additional information Xb
and of Xc. That is, the price of information that does not affect the DM’s payoff,
as well as the price of information that affects the DM’s payoff. This is done by
comparing the optimal value of two bandit problems that differ in the information
of the DM.
The next corollary to Theorem 2.6 states that, using cut-off strategies, additional
information is more profitable.10
Corollary 2.7. Suppose that there are two decision makers, DM1 and DM2, who
hold the correct prior, i.e. q0 = p0, and use cut-off strategies. DM1 receives and
observes the payoff process (Xa(t)), observes but does not receive the payoff process
(Xb(t)), and receives but does not observe the payoff process (Xc(t)). DM2 receives
and observes the payoff process (Xa(t)), and receives but does not observe the payoff
process (Xc(t)). Then the optimal expected payoff of DM1 is higher than the optimal
expected payoff of DM2.
2.6. Optimism vs Pessimism. As mentioned before, the phenomenon of over
confidence is common in many decision problems. In this section we apply the
result of Section 2.4, and investigate who will fare better in two-armed bandit
problems, an optimist who assigns a probability higher than the true probability
to the High type, or a pessimist who assigns a probability lower than the true
probability to the High type.
Suppose that there are two decision makers, DM1 and DM2, who face indepen-
dent identical copies of the decision problem. DM1 is an optimist, and believes
that the probability of High is p0 + ρ, where ρ > 0, while DM2 is a pessimist,
and believes that the probability of High is p0 − ρ, and both play optimally given
their beliefs. If p0 − ρ ≤ p∗, the pessimist will always choose the safe arm, since
according to his subjective belief the prior is at most the cut-off. Assume then that
p0 − ρ > p∗. For every ǫ ∈ [p∗ − p0, 1 − p0] denote by Vp0(ǫ) the expected payoff
for a DM playing optimally according to the incorrect prior p0+ ǫ, where ǫ may be
negative. It turns out that the answer regarding who will fare better, an optimist
or a pessimist, depends on α that is defined in Eq. (2.2).
Theorem 2.8. Assume that Assumption 2.1 holds.
1. If α > 1, then for every ǫ > 0 such that p∗ < p0±ǫ ≤ 1 we have Vp0(ǫ) > Vp0(−ǫ):
an optimist will fare better.
2. If 0 < α < 1, then for every ǫ > 0 such that p∗ < p0 ± ǫ ≤ α+23 we
have Vp0(ǫ) > Vp0(−ǫ): an optimist will fare better; for every ǫ > 0 such that
α+2
3 < p0 ± ǫ < 1 we have Vp0(ǫ) < Vp0(−ǫ): a pessimist will fare better.
Thus, an optimist will fare better than a pessimist, unless α is low and p0 − ε is
high. That is, a pessimist will fare better only if the following two conditions are
satisfied:
1) The pessimist assigns high probability to the High type.
2) The two DM’s are sufficiently patient, or it is easy to distinguish between the
10It is well known that in one-player optimization problems, additional information cannot
hurt the DM, since he can always ignore it. However, a Markovian cut-off strategy does not allow
a player to forget additional information, and therefore the statement is not trivial.
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two types of the risky arm.
Otherwise, an optimist will fare better.
Since p∗ = α(s−g2)(α+1)(g1−s)+α(s−g2) , the condition p
∗ < α+23 is not always satisfied.
If 3g1 + g2 ≥ 4s, then p∗ < α+23 . If 3g1 + g2 < 4s, then p∗ < α+23 if and only if
α <
4s−3g1−g2−
√
(4s−3g1−g2)2−8(g1−g2)(g1−s)
2(g1−g2) or α >
4s−3g1−g2+
√
(4s−3g1−g2)2−8(g1−g2)(g1−s)
2(g1−g2) .
We obtain the same result if the biases of the optimist and the pessimist are
geometric rather than absolute, that is, if the initial prior of the optimist is (1 +
ǫ)p0 = p0 + ǫp0 and the initial prior of the pessimist is (1 − ǫ)p0 = p0 − ǫp0. This
is true since the absolute bias of the optimist and the pessimist is the same: ǫp0.
3. Future directions
Our results call for further research. We here list few possible directions for
future research.
• We studied the case that the distribution of the High type dominates the
distribution of the Low type in a strong sense (see Assumptions 2.1). These
assumptions ensure that the discontinuities of the process of posterior belief
are always to one direction. It would be interesting to know whether a
similar characterization holds under only assumptions A1 and A2.
• We assumed that the payoff is distributed according to a Le´vy process.
It would be interesting to solve the model when the payoff is distributed
according to a geometric Le´vy process.
• Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller, Rady and Cripps (2004), and Keller and
Rady (2008) study a strategic version of the model, in which several de-
cision makers face identical unknown arms. Klein and Rady (2008) study
a strategic version of the model, in which the arms of two DMs are neg-
atively correlated. It will be interesting to solve these models, when the
payoff distributions are general Le´vy processes.
4. Proofs
4.1. Proof of Proposition 2.2. We already argued that U is non-decreasing and
convex. It is left to prove that it is continuous. Since U(p) is convex, it is continuous
on (0, 1). If the DM had known the true type of the arm, his optimal payoff would
have been pg1+(1−p)s. Since this information is not available, U(p) ≤ pg1+(1−p)s.
Since U(p) ≥ s for every p, this implies lim
p→0
U(p) = s = U(0). Since the DM can
follow the strategy that always selects the risky arm, U(p) ≥ pg1 + (1− p)g2. This
implies that lim
p→1
U(p) = g1 = U(1). Thus, U is continuous on [0, 1].
4.2. The Control Equation. In this section we express the optimal payoff U(p)
using the dynamic programming principle. This representation extends that in
Bolton and Harris (1999) to the more general setup of Le´vy payoff processes. we
start by calculating how the belief of the DM is updated given his observations.
To simplify notation, it is convenient to divide various expressions by the standard
deviation σ; set µ˜1 =
µ1
σ , µ˜2 =
µ2
σ and µ˜ =
µ
σ , and denote dY˜
k
B :=
1√
kσ
dY kB =
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√
kµ˜dt+dZ(t), modulo the factor
√
κσ, dY˜ kB is the contribution to the payoff of the
linear drift and the Brownian motion. Then the probability of obtaining a specific
observation (that is not a jump) given the type is:
P (dY˜ kB |µ˜) = P (dY˜ kB |µ) =
1√
2πdt
e−
(dY˜ k
B
(t)−
√
kµ˜dt)2
2dt = C · e
√
kµ˜dY˜ kB− kµ˜
2(dt)2
2
= C(1 +
√
kµ˜dY˜ kB + o((dt)
2)),
where C is a constant independent of µ. Denote P˜ (dY˜ kB |µ˜) := 1 +
√
kµ˜dY˜ kB .
Let p = Pt(θ1) be the belief at time t that the risky arm is High. Then:
Pt+dt(θ1) =
P (dY kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p
P (dY kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p+ P (dY kB |θ2)P (dY kP |θ2)(1 − p)
=
P (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p
P (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p+ P (dY˜ kB |θ2)P (dY kP |θ2)(1− p)
=
P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p
P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p+ P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ2)P (dY kP |θ2)(1− p)
.
This is the Bayesian belief updating, using the independence of the components
in the Le´vy-Ito decomposition, given the risky-arm type θ. The next lemma ex-
presses the change in the posterior belief over time. The lemma handles separately
the case where there are no jumps in the time interval [t, t+dt), and the case where
there is a jump in this interval.
Lemma 4.1.
1. Suppose that there are no jumps during the time interval [t, t+ dt). Then:
(4.1) dPt := Pt+dt(θ1)− Pt(θ1) = p(1− p)
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)dZ˜ − p(1− p)k(ν¯1 − ν¯2)dt,
where dZ˜ = dY˜ kB −
√
k(pµ˜1 + (1− p)µ˜2)dt is a standard Brownian motion.
2. Suppose that during the interval [t, t+ dt) a jump of size h occurred. Then:
(4.2) Pt+dt(θ1) = Ph +
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)Ph(1− Ph)dZ˜2,
where Ph :=
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh)+(1−p)ν2(dh) , and dZ˜2 := dY˜
k
B −
√
k(µ˜1Ph + µ˜2(1 − Ph))dt.
The first term in the right-hand side of (4.2) is the contribution of the continuous
part of the payoff process to the change in the belief, while the second term is the
contribution of the fact that no jump arrived. This latter contribution is negative
due to Assumption A3. If a jump of size h occurs during the interval [t, t+dt), then
the contribution of the continuous part of the payoff process is (µ˜1 − µ˜2)(dY˜ kB −√
k(µ˜1Ph + µ˜2(1 − Ph))dt), and the compound Poisson process’ contribution is
Ph :=
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh)+(1−p)ν2(dh) . The latter is the Bayesian update of the probability that
the risky arm is High given that a jump of size h occurred. Note that p < Ph.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The proof of the lemma is standard and non-inspiring.
The first statement follows from a long chain of equalities. Assume that there is no
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jump in the interval [t, t+ dt)
dPt =
p(1− p)[P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)− P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ2)P (dY kP |θ2)]
P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ1)P (dY kP |θ1)p+ P˜ (dY˜ kB |θ2)P (dY kP |θ2)(1− p)
=
p(1− p)[(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜
k
B)(e
−ν¯1kdt)− (1 +
√
kµ˜2dY˜
k
B )(e
−ν¯2kdt)]
(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜ kB)(e
−ν¯1kdt)p+ (1 +
√
kµ˜2dY˜ kB)(e
−ν¯2kdt)(1− p)
=
p(1− p)[(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜
k
B)(1 − ν¯1kdt)− (1 +
√
kµ˜2dY˜
k
B)(1 − ν¯2kdt)]
(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜ kB)(1 − ν¯1kdt)p+ (1 +
√
kµ˜2dY˜ kB )(1− ν¯2kdt)(1− p)
=
p(1− p)[
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)dY˜ kB − (ν¯1 − ν¯2)kdt]
1 +
√
k(pµ˜1 + (1− p)µ˜2)dY˜ kB − k(pν¯1 + (1 − p)ν¯2)dt
=p(1− p)[
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)dY˜ kB − (ν¯1 − ν¯2)kdt]·
· [1−
√
k(pµ˜1 + (1− p)µ˜2)dY˜ kB + k(pν¯1 + (1 − p)ν¯2)dt+ k(pν¯1 + (1− p)ν¯2)2dt]
=p(1− p)[
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)(dY˜ kB −
√
k(pµ˜1 + (1− p)µ˜2)dt)− k(ν¯1 − ν¯2)dt]
=p(1− p)
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)dZ˜ − p(1− p)k(ν¯1 − ν¯2)dt.
In the calculations we used the fact that dZ˜ = dY˜ kB −
√
k(pµ˜1 + (1 − p)µ˜2)dt is
a standard Brownian motion (see Bolton and Harris (1999)), and the Brownian
motion properties: dZ2 = dt, and dZdt = 0. We also ignored terms of order (dt)3/2
and above.
We now prove the second statement.
Pt+dt(θ1) =
pν1(dh)(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜
k
B)
[ν1(dh)p+ ν2(dh)(1− p)] +
√
k[ν1(dh)µ˜1p+ ν2(dh)µ˜2(1− p)]dY˜ kB
=
Ph(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜
k
B )
1 +
√
k[µ˜1Ph + µ˜2(1− Ph)]dY˜ kB
= Ph(1 +
√
kµ˜1dY˜
k
B )[1−
√
k(Phµ˜1 + (1− Ph)µ˜2)dY˜ kB + k(Phµ˜1 + (1 − Ph)µ˜2)2dt]
= Ph[1 +
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)(1− Ph)(dY˜ kB −
√
k(µ˜1Ph + µ˜2(1− Ph))dt)]
= Ph +
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)Ph(1− Ph)dZ˜2.

We now formulate the control equation that describes the optimal payoff.
(CE)
U(p) = max
k∈[0,1]
{[(1−k)s+k(p(ν¯1H1+µ1)+(1−p)(ν¯2H2+µ2))]rdt+e−rdtE[U(p+dp)]},
where k is the control variable. The first term within the maximization is the
expected instantaneous payoff, and the second term is the discounted expected
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continuation payoff. The following lemma provides a more convenient form to the
control equation, in terms of the derivatives of U .
Lemma 4.2. The following equality holds:
U(p) = max
k∈[0,1]
{(1− k)s+ k(p(ν¯1H1 + µ1) + (1− p)(ν¯2H2 + µ2))
(CE2)
+
1
r
[
k
∫
(pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh))U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
− kp(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)U ′(p)− k(pν¯1 + (1− p)ν¯2)U(p)
+
1
2
kU ′′(p)p2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2
]}
, p− a.s.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Since U(p) is convex, U(p) is twice differentiable p-a.s. (in
the sense of the Lebesgue measure). With probability [p(1 − kν¯1dt) + (1 − p)(1 −
kν¯2dt)] there are no jumps in the interval [t, t+ dt). In this case, using the Taylor
expansion of U , and ignoring terms of order (dt)3/2 and higher, we obtain that the
optimal payoff is U(p + dˇp) = U(p) + U ′(p)dˇp + 12U
′′(p)(dˇp)2 a.s.,11 where dˇp is
given by the right-hand side of (4.1).
With probability [pkν1(dh)dt + (1 − p)kν2(dh)dt] there is a jump of size h, and
the optimal payoff is U(Ph +
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)Ph(1− Ph)dZ˜2) = U(Ph) + U ′(Ph)dˆPh +
1
2U
′′(Ph)dˆPh, where dˆPh :=
√
k(µ˜1 − µ˜2)Ph(1− Ph)dZ˜2.
During the subsequent calculations we use the following Eqs. (4.3), (4.4), (4.5)
and (4.6), that can be derived from Lemma 4.1:
(4.3) E[dˇp] = −kp(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)dt.
This is the expectation of the change in the belief, given that no jump occurred
during the interval [t, t+ dt).
(4.4) E[dˇp2] = kp2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2dt.
This is the second moment of the change in the belief, given that no jump occurred
during the interval [t, t+ dt).
(4.5) E[dˆPh] = C1 · dt.
This is the expected contribution of the Brownian motion part to the posterior
belief, given that a jump of size h occurred during the interval [t, t+ dt).
(4.6) E[dˆP 2h ] = C2 · dt.
This is the second moment of the contribution of the Brownian motion part to the
posterior belief, given that a jump of size h occurred during the interval [t, t+ dt).
In Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6), C1 and C2 are constants. Using the above notation, we
11Since we can ignore terms or order (dt)3/2 and higher, it is sufficient to consider the Taylor
expansion up to the second derivative.
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obtain from (CE):
U(p) = max
k∈[0,1]
{[(1− k)s+ k(p(ν¯1H1 + µ1) + (1− p)(ν¯2H2 + µ2))]rdt
(4.7)
+ (1− rdt)
[
kdt
[∫ [
U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
+U ′
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
C1dt
+ U ′′
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
C2dt
]
(pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh))
]
+ [1− k(pν¯1 + (1 − p)ν¯2)dt]
[
U(p) + U ′(p)E[dˇp] +
1
2
U ′′(p)E[dˇp2]
]]}
, p− a.s.
The second, third and fourth lines in (4.7) represent the expected continuation
payoff given a jump of size h occurred during the time interval [t, t+ dt), and the
fifth line represents the expected continuation payoff given no jump occurred during
the time interval [t, t + dt). Using (dt)2 = 0, several of the terms in (4.7) vanish,
and we obtain:
U(p) = max
k∈[0,1]
{[(1− k)s+ k(p(ν¯1H1 + µ1) + (1− p)(ν¯2H2 + µ2))]rdt
(4.8)
+ kdt
∫
U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh)
)
(pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh))
+ U(p)− kdtp(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)U ′(p)dt− k(pν¯1 + (1− p)ν¯2)U(p)dt− rU(p)dt
+
1
2
kU ′′(p)p2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2dt
}
, p− a.s.
Eliminating U(p) from both sides, and dividing by dt, we obtain (CE2) after simple
algebraic manipulations, as desired. 
From Eq. (4.7) it follows that the contribution of the continuation payoff given
that a jump of size h occurred during the time interval [t, t+ dt) is
kdt
[∫ [
U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
+U ′
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh)
)
C1dt
(4.9)
+ U ′′
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh)
)
C2dt
]
(pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh))
]
.
The parameters of the Brownian motion affect (4.9) only through C1 and C2, and
since C1 and C2 do not appear in Eq. (4.8), it follows that if a jump occurs during
the time interval [t, t+dt), the information from the compound Poisson process has
more impact than the information of the Brownian motion.
According to (CE2), the payoff is the maximum over the control variable k of the ex-
pectation of the current flow payoff [(1− k)s+ k(p(ν¯1H1 + µ1) + (1− p)(ν¯2H2 + µ2))]
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plus the discounted value of the continuation payoff
1
r
[
k
∫
(pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh))U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
− kp(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)U ′(p) + 1
2
kU ′′(p)p2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2 − k(pν¯1 + (1− p)ν¯2)U(p)
]
.
A solution κ to this maximization problem must satisfy:
(4.10) k =


0 if b(p, U) < s− [pg1 + (1− p)g2],
∈ [0, 1] if b(p, U) = s− [pg1 + (1− p)g2],
1 if b(p, U) > s− [pg1 + (1− p)g2],
where
b(p, U) =
1
r
[∫
(pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh))U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh)
)
− p(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)U ′(p)− (pν¯1 + (1 − p)ν¯2)U(p)
+
1
2
U ′′(p)p2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2
]
.
The function within the maximization in (CE2) is linear in k. Therefore, it achieves
its maximum at k = 1 or k = 0, p-a.s. From Proposition 2.2, U(p) is non-decreasing
and continuous, and therefore there is p∗ such that U(p) = s for every p ≤ p∗. Thus
k = 0 is optimal for p < p∗. For every p > p∗, we have U(p) > s, so that in this
case k = 1 is optimal p-a.s.12
4.3. Characterizing the optimal strategy and the value. When it is optimal
to play safe, that is, when the optimal solution of (CE) is k∗ = 0, we have U(p) = s.
When it is optimal to play risky, that is, when the optimal solution of (CE) is k∗ = 1,
it follows from Lemma 4.2 that U(p) solves the following functional differential
equation:
U(p) = p(ν¯1H1 + µ1) + (1− p)(ν¯2H2 + µ2)(FDE)
+
1
r
[∫
(pν1(dh) + (1− p)ν2(dh))U
(
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh) + (1 − p)ν2(dh)
)
− p(1− p)(ν¯1 − ν¯2)U ′(p)− (pν¯1 + (1− p)ν¯2)U(p)
+
1
2
U ′′(p)p2(1− p)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2
]
, a.s. in (p∗, 1).
A solution U(p) for this equation must be smooth (Friedman (1969), p.56).13 There-
fore, U(p) satisfies Eq. (FDE) in (p∗, 1) always, and k = 1 is optimal in (p∗, 1).
12Recall that Eq. (CE2) is satisfied p-a.s., since U ′(p) and U ′′(p) exist p-a.s. In the next
Section we show that the optimal strategy is in fact a cut-off strategy.
13 To see that the conditions of Friedman (1969) are satisfied, substitute f(p) =
R
(pν1(dh) +
(1 − p)ν2(dh))U
“
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh)+(1−p)ν2(dh)
”
− U(p)(r + (pν¯1 + (1 − p)ν¯2)). Since U(p) is continuous,
so is f , and we get U ∈ C2, as Friedman (1969) requires.
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Hence, there is an optimal cut-off strategy κ∗ with cut-off point p∗.
The next lemma suggests one solution to Eq. (FDE). To prove it, substitute the
expression for U(p) defined in Eq. (4.11) below into Eq. (FDE). Recall that
f(η) =
∫
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν¯1 − ν¯2)− ν¯2 + 1
2
(η + 1)η(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2 − r
(see (2.2)), that α is the unique solution of the equation f(η) = 0 in (0,∞), and
that p∗ and Cα were defined in the statement of Theorem 2.3.
Lemma 4.3. One smooth solution to Eq. (FDE) is
(4.11) U(p) = pg1 + (1− p)g2 + Cα(1 − p)
(
1− p
p
)α
,
where α ∈ (0,∞) solves the equation f(η) = 0.
In order to see that the function U(p), defined above, actually solves (FDE), we
use the fact that Ph =
pν1(dh)
pν1(dh)+(1−p)ν2(dh) ≥ p∗ for every p > p∗, ν1−a.s., which is
equivalent to Assumption A3. Thus, the form of our solution crucially depends on
this assumption.
In fact, one can verify that
U(p) = pg1 + (1− p)g2 + C(1 − p)
(
1− p
p
)α
+D(1 − p)
(
1− p
p
)β
solves Eq. (FDE), where α is as in the statement of Lemma 4.3, and β is the unique
solution14 of f(η) = 0 in (−∞, 0). The following lemma assures that α is well
defined.
Lemma 4.4. The equation f(η) = 0 admits a unique solution in the interval (0,∞).
Proof.
The function f is a continuous function that satisfies f(0) < 0 and f(∞) =∞. To
show that f(η) = 0 has a unique solution, it is therefore sufficient to prove that
f is increasing in η. Note that if µ1 6= µ2, then 12 (η + 1)η(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2 − r − ν¯2 is
increasing in η, and constant otherwise. It remains to prove that if ν1 6= ν2 (i.e.
ν1(R\{0}) > ν2(R\{0})) , then
∫
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν¯1 − ν¯2) is increasing in η.
Since∫
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν¯1− ν¯2) =
∫ [
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν1(dh)− ν2(dh))
]
,
and ∫
{h| ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
=1}
[
ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν1(dh)− ν2(dh))
]
= 0,
it is sufficient to prove that for ν1−a.e. h ∈ {h| ν2(dh)ν1(dh) < 1},
gh(η) = ν2(dh)
(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ η(ν1(dh)− ν2(dh))
14In fact, such a solution β must be smaller then −1.
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is increasing in η. Now,
g′h(η) = −ν2(dh) ln
(
ν1(dh)
ν2(dh)
)(
ν2(dh)
ν1(dh)
)η
+ (ν1(dh)− ν2(dh))
> −ν2(dh) ln
(
ν1(dh)
ν2(dh)
)
+ (ν1(dh)− ν2(dh)) > 0,
where the first inequality holds since η > 0 and by Assumption A3. The second
inequality holds since − ln(x) + x − 1 > 0 for every x 6= 1. Therefore, gh(η) is
increasing, as desired. 
We now prove that Eq. (FDE) has a unique solution.
Lemma 4.5. For every p1 < p2, and every u1, u2 ∈ R, there is a unique solution
U(p) satisfying Eq. (FDE) in the interval (p1, p2) with the boundary conditions
U(p1) = u1, U(p2) = u2.
Proof.
Since Eq. (FDE) is a non-homogenous linear equation in U , if there are two solutions
of Eq. (FDE), then their difference is a solution of the homogenous version of Eq.
(FDE). To prove the lemma, it is therefore sufficient to fix a solution W of the
homogenous version of Eq. (FDE) that satisfies W (p1) = W (p2) = 0 and to prove
that W ≡ 0.
Suppose that W achieves its maximum at pˆ. Then W ′(pˆ) = 0, therefore:
W (pˆ) =
1
r
[∫
(pˆν1(dh) + (1 − pˆ)ν2(dh))W
(
pˆν1(dh)
pˆν1(dh) + (1− pˆ)ν2(dh)
)
+
1
2
W ′′(pˆ)pˆ2(1− pˆ)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2 − (pˆν¯1 + (1 − pˆ)ν¯2)W (pˆ)
]
.
Moreover, since the maximum is achieved at pˆ, W ′′(pˆ) ≤ 0, simple algebraic
manipulations imply that:
(r + pˆν¯1 + (1− pˆ)ν¯2)W (pˆ) =
∫
(pˆν1(dh) + (1− pˆ)ν2(dh))W
(
pˆν1(dh)
pˆν1(dh) + (1 − pˆ)ν2(dh)
)
+
1
2
W ′′(pˆ)pˆ2(1 − pˆ)2(µ˜1 − µ˜2)2
≤W (pˆ)
∫
(pˆν1(dh) + (1− pˆ)ν2(dh))
= (pˆν¯1 + (1− pˆ)ν¯2)W (pˆ).
Since r > 0 we conclude that W (pˆ) = 0. A similar argument shows that the
minimum of W in (p1, p2) is 0, so that W (p) ≡ 0 on (p1, p2), as desired. 
As mentioned before, there is an optimal cut-off strategy with corresponding
payoff U . Lemmas 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 prove that U is the unique solution of Eq.
(FDE). We now prove Theorem 2.3, which provides an explicit form to the optimal
strategy and to the payoff function.
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Proof of Theorem 2.3.
Recall that κ∗ is the optimal cut-off strategy (with cut-off point p∗). To complete
the proof of the theorem, we provide an explicit expression to p∗ and to U . To this
end, we first prove that the right-hand derivative of U at p∗ is 0.
Let U ′R(p
∗) = lim
ε→0+
U(p∗+ε)−U(p∗)
ε be the right derivative of U at the cut-off
point p∗. Since U is convex, U ′R(p
∗) is well defined. Since U is non-decreasing,
U ′R(p
∗) ≥ 0. We now prove that U ′R(p∗) ≤ 0. For every q0 ∈ [0, 1], let κ(q0) be
the strategy that plays as κ, assuming the prior belief is q0 rather then p0. Define
Mκ :=
∫∞
0
re−rtdY κ(t), the discounted payoff under the strategy κ.
lim
ǫ→0+
E
[
Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)
∣∣ θ] = s ∀θ ∈ {θ1, θ2}.
Indeed, as explained before, the posterior belief will drop below p0 in an infinites-
imal time interval around 0. Therefore,15 as ǫ goes to 0, the probability that the
DM stops “quite fast” under κ∗(p∗ + ǫ) goes to 1.
Since κ∗ is the optimal cut-off strategy, and since it is independent of the prior
belief p0, we deduce that for every p ∈ [0, 1], U(p) = Vκ∗(p)(p). Therefore:
U ′R(p
∗) = lim
ǫ→0+
U(p∗ + ǫ)− U(p∗)
ǫ
(4.12)
= lim
ǫ→0+
Vκ∗(p∗+ǫ)(p
∗ + ǫ)− Vκ∗(p∗)(p∗)
ǫ
= lim
ǫ→0+
1
ǫ
[
(p∗ + ǫ)E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ1] +(1− p∗ − ǫ)E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ2]
]
−p∗E[Mκ∗(p∗)|θ1]− (1 − p∗)E[Mκ∗(p∗)|θ2]
]
= lim
ǫ→0+
{
1
ǫ
[
p∗E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ1] + (1− p∗)E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ2]
−p∗E[Mκ∗(p∗)|θ1]− (1− p∗)E[Mκk(p∗)|θ2]
]
+E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ1]− E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ2]
}
.
By the optimality of U(p), U(p∗) ≥ Vκ∗(p∗+ǫ)(p∗), and therefore,
lim
ǫ→0+
1
ǫ
[
p∗E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ1] + (1− p∗)E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ2]− p∗E[Mκ∗(p∗)|θ1]− (1− p∗)E[Mκ∗(p∗)|θ2]
](4.13)
= lim
ǫ→0+
1
ǫ
[Vκ∗(p∗+ǫ)(p
∗)− Vκ∗(p∗)(p∗)] = lim
ǫ→0+
1
ǫ
[Vκ∗(p∗+ǫ)(p
∗)− U(p∗)] ≤ 0,
and
(4.14) lim
ǫ→0+
(
E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ1]− E[Mκ∗(p∗+ǫ)|θ2]
)
= 0.
Substituting (4.13) and (4.14) in (4.12) we deduce that U ′R(p
∗) ≤ 0.
15By the same argument we get that Vκ′(p) is continuous in p
′, where κ′ is a cut-off strategy
with cut-off point p′.
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As mentioned in Lemma 2.2, U(p∗) = s, and U(1) = g1. By Lemma 4.5, the
unique solution of Eq. (FDE) on (p∗, 1] is U(p) = pg1+(1−p)g2+Cα(1−p)
(
1−p
p
)α
.
By imposing U(p∗) = s and U ′R(p
∗) = 0 we get p∗ = α(s−g2)(α+1)(g1−s)+α(s−g2) , and
Cα =
s−g2−p∗(g1−g2)
(1−p∗)( 1−p∗
p∗ )
α
. Uniqueness follows by (4.10).

4.4. Incorrect Prior. To find the expected discounted payoff for a DM who plays
according to an incorrect prior q0, we present here a condition which is equivalent
to (2.6). Substituting Y 1B(t) = µt+ σZ(t) and µ˜ =
µ
σ in (2.6), we get:
Z(t)+
[
2µ˜−µ˜1−µ˜2
2 − ν¯1−ν¯2µ˜1−µ˜2
]
t > − 1µ˜1−µ˜2
[
ln
(
q0
1−q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1−p′
)]
− 1µ˜1−µ˜2
∑
t− ln
(
ν1(dhj)
ν2(dhj)
)
.
It follows that the DM selects the risky arm until the first time t is satisfied:
Bµ(t) := Z(t) +
[
2µ˜− µ˜1 − µ˜2
2
− ν¯1 − ν¯2
µ˜1 − µ˜2
]
t
(4.15)
≤ − 1
µ˜1 − µ˜2
[
ln
(
q0
1− q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1− p′
)]
− 1
µ˜1 − µ˜2
∑
t−
ln
(
ν1(dhj)
ν2(dhj)
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. If the prior belief of the DM, q0, satisfies q0 ≥ p′ then
there is a bijection relation between E and q0, If q0 ≤ p′, then the DM always
chooses the safe arm, which is equivalent to E = 0. Therefore, we will use the
notation U(p0, E) instead of U(p0, q0) when the former is more convenient. We
now prove that under Assumption 2.1, for every p0 ∈ [0, 1] and every E ∈ [0,∞),
the payoff of the DM is
U(p0, E) = p0g1+(1−p0)g2+(s−g1)p0e−(µ˜1−µ˜2)(α+1)E+(s−g2)(1−p0)e−(µ˜1−µ˜2)αE .
Using Eq. (4.15), we construct an integral equation, to find the utility function
for a DM who has a prior belief q0. Let τ be the stopping time of the first jump.
Let T be the first time t satisfying (4.15). The DM chooses the risky arm until
the stopping time T , and then he switches to the safe arm. The calculations use
dynamic programming in which the continuation payoff is determined by the time
of the first jump, τ , and the value of the continuous part of the payoff at that time.
Notation and Formulas. The proof requires computations that rely on some
results on Brownian motion. In this subsection we provide these results, that are
derived using Borodin and Salminen (1996) p.197 - 223. Recall that, µ˜ = µσ is
determined by θ. Notice that Bµ(t) is a standard Brownian motion with drift
Fµ :=
[
2µ˜− µ˜1 − µ˜2
2
− ν¯1 − ν¯2
µ˜1 − µ˜2
]
t. Define fθi(Bµi (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t) := Pθ(B
µ(τ) ∈
dx, τ = t|τ < T ). This is the probability that the first jump occurs in the interval
[t, t+dt), and Bµ belongs to [x, x+dx), given a jump occurs before the DM switches
to the safe arm.
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Denote
pt,h,x := P (θ1|τ < T, τ = t, Bµ(τ) ∈ dx, h)
(4.16)
=
P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ(τ) ∈ dx, h|θ1)P (θ1)
P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ(τ) ∈ dx, h|θ1)P (θ1) + P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ(τ) ∈ dx, h|θ2)P (θ2)
=
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1 + (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν2(dh)/ν¯2
.
This is the posterior belief that the type is θ1, given that (a) the first jump that
occurred in the time interval [t, t + dt) has size h; (b) it occurred before the DM
switched to the safe arm; and (c) the Brownian motion with drift, Bµ(t), is in the
interval [x, x+ dx).
The probability that the DM switches to the safe arm before the first jump ap-
peared is
Pθ(τ > T ) = Pθ( inf
0<s<τ
Bµ(s) ≤ −E) = e−E(Fµ+
√
2ν¯+F 2µ).(4.17)
The expected discounted payoff from the continuous part of the risky arm, until
the switching time to the safe arm, given the DM switched before the first jump, is
Eθ
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY 1B(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
= µEθ
[∫ T
0
re−rtdt
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
+ σEθ
[∫ T
0
re−rtdZt
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
](4.18)
= µEθ[1− e−rT |τ > T ] = µ(1 − Eθ[e−rT |τ > T ]).
The expected discounted payoff from the safe arm, after the switching time to the
safe arm, given the DM switched before the first jump, is
Eθ
[∫ ∞
T
re−rtsdt
∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
= sEθ
[
e−rT |τ > T ] .(4.19)
The expected discounted payoff from the continuous part of the risky arm, until
the first jump occurs, given the first jump occurred before the switching time, is
Eθ
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY 1B(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
]
= µ(1 − Eθ
[
e−rτ |τ < T ]).(4.20)
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The expression on the right-hand side of (4.19), can be re-written using the following
list of equalities:
Eθ[e
−rT |τ > T ] = Eθ[e
−rT , τ > T ]
Pθ(τ > T )
=
∫
e−rt1Pθ(T ∈ dt1, t1 < τ)dt1
Pθ(τ > T )
(4.21)
=
∫
e−rt1Pθ(T ∈ dt1)Pθ(t1 < τ)dt1
Pθ(τ > T )
=
∫
e−rt1Pθ(T ∈ dt1)e−ν¯t1dt1
Pθ(τ > T )
=
∫
e−(r+ν¯)t1Pθ(T ∈ dt1)dt1
Pθ(τ > T )
=
Eθ[e
−(r+ν¯)T ]
Pθ(τ > T )
=
e−E(Fµ+
√
2(r+ν¯)+F 2µ)
Pθ(τ > T )
=
Pθ(τ
r > T )
Pθ(τ > T )
,
where Pθ(τ
r > t) = e−(r+ν¯)t, and Pθ(τr > T ) = e
−E(Fµ+
√
2(ν¯+r)+F 2µ). Similarly,
the expression on the right-hand side of (4.20) can be re-written as follows:
Eθ[e
−rτ |τ < T ] =
∫
e−rt1Pθ(τ ∈ dt1|τ < T )dt1 =
∫
e−rt1Pθ(τ ∈ dt1, t1 < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
dt1
(4.22)
=
∫
e−rt1Pθ(τ ∈ dt1)Pθ(t1 < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
dt1 =
∫
e−rt1 ν¯e−ν¯t1Pθ(t1 < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
dt1
=
ν¯
ν¯ + r
∫
(ν¯ + r)
e−(r+ν¯)t1Pθ(t1 < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
dt1
=
ν¯
ν¯ + r
∫
Pθ(τ
r ∈ dt1)Pθ(t1 < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
dt1 =
ν¯
ν¯ + r
Pθ(τ
r < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
.
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In the proof of Theorem 2.5 we use the following two identities:
∫ ∞
0
fθi(Bµi (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−γtdt =
∫
e−γtPθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx, τ ∈ dt
)
Pθ(τ < T )
(4.23)
=
∫
e−γtPθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx
)
Pθ(τ ∈ dt)dt
Pθ(τ < T )
=
∫
e−γtPθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx
)
ν¯e−ν¯tdt
Pθ(τ < T )
=
ν¯
ν¯ + γ
∫
(ν¯ + γ)e−(γ+ν¯)tPθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx
)
dt
Pθ(τ < T )
=
ν¯
ν¯ + γ
∫
Pθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx
)
Pθ(τ
γ ∈ dt)dt
Pθ(τ < T )
=
ν¯
ν¯ + γ
∫
Pθ
(
inf
0<s<t
Bµ(s) ≥ −E,Bµ(t) ∈ dx, τγ ∈ dt
)
dt
Pθ(τ < T )
=
ν¯
ν¯ + γ
Pθ(B
µ(τγ) ∈ dx, τγ < T )
Pθ(τ < T )
.
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∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθi(Bµi (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−γte−δxdtdx =
ν¯
ν¯ + γ
∫∞
−E Pθ(B
µ(τγ) ∈ dx, τγ < T )e−δxdx
Pθ(τ < T )
(4.24)
=
ν¯
(ν¯ + γ)Pθ(τ < T )
∫ ∞
−E
Pθ
(
inf
0<s<τγ
Bµ(s) > −E,Bµ(τγ) ∈ dx
)
e−δxdx
=
ν¯
(ν¯ + γ)Pθ(τ < T )
∫ ∞
−E
[
Pθ(B
µ(τγ) ∈ dx)e−δx − Pθ
(
inf
0<s<τγ
Bµ(s) ≤ −E,Bµ(τγ) ∈ dx
)
e−δx
]
dx
=
ν¯ + γ√
2(ν¯ + γ) + F 2µ
ν¯
(ν¯ + γ)Pθ(τ < T )
·
·
∫ ∞
−E
[
e(Fµ−δ)x−|x|
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ − e−x(
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ+δ−Fµ)e−2E
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ
]
dx
=
ν¯√
2(ν¯ + γ) + F 2µPθ(τ < T )
·
[∫ ∞
0
e−x(
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ+δ−Fµ) +
∫ 0
−E
ex(
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ−δ+Fµ)
−e−2E
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ
∫ ∞
−E
e−x(
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ+δ−Fµ)
]
=
ν¯(1− e−E(
√
2(ν¯+γ)+F 2µ+Fµ−δ))
(ν¯ + γ + δFµ − δ2/2)Pθ(τ < T ) .
Where the first equality follows by (4.23).
Constructing the integral equation. The DM chooses the risky arm, until
the minimum between the stopping time of the first jump τ and the stopping time
T . We distinguish between two cases. In case the DM stops before the time of the
first jump τ , we calculate the expected discounted payoff from the risky arm until
the stopping time T , and the expected discounted payoff from the safe arm after
the stopping time T . In case the first jump occurs before the stopping time T , we
calculate the expected discounted payoff received from the continuous part Y 1B(t)
until time τ . We add the expected discounted payoff from the first jump, and the
expected discounted continuation payoff, updating both the posterior pt,h,x, and
the intercept E +Gh + x, according to the time of the first jump, the first jump’s
size, and the value of the continuous part of the payoff.
The notation used are as follows: Pθ(τ > T ) is the probability that the DM switches
to the safe arm before a jump occurs. If τ > T then the expected payoff from the
risky arm is Eθ[
∫ T
0 re
−rtdY 1B(t)|τ > T ], and the expected payoff from the safe arm
is Eθ[
∫∞
T re
−rtsdt|τ > T ]. Pθ(τ < T ) is the probability a jump occurs before the
DM switches to the safe arm. If τ < T then the expected payoff until the first
jump is Eθ[
∫ τ
0
re−rtdY 1B(t)|τ < T ]. fθi(Bµi (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t) is the probability that the
first jump occurs in the interval [t, t+ dt), and Bµ(τ) belongs to [x, x + dx), given
that a jump occurs before the DM switches to the safe arm. re−rt 1ν¯
∫
hν(dh) is the
expected discounted payoff from the first jump, and 1ν¯
∫
νe−rtU(pt,h,x, E+Gh+x))
is the expected discounted continuation payoff, updating both the posterior pt,h,x,
and the intercept E +Gh + x at time t. With this notation, the expected payoff is
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as follows:
.(4.25)
U(p0, E) = p0Pθ1(τ < T )
[
Eθ1 [
∫ τ
0 re
−rtdY 1B(t)|τ < T ]
+
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
fθ1(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
(
re−rt 1ν¯1
∫
ν1(dh)h+
1
ν¯1
∫
ν1(dh)e
−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)
)
dtdx
]
+p0Pθ1(τ > T )
[
Eθ1 [
∫ T
0 re
−rtdY 1B(t)|τ > T ] + Eθ1 [
∫∞
T re
−rtsdt|τ > T ]
]
+(1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )
[
Eθ2 [
∫ τ
0
re−rtdY 1B(t)|τ < T ]
+
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
(
re−rt 1ν¯2
∫
ν2(dh)h+
1
ν¯2
∫
ν2(dh)e
−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)
)
dtdx
]
+(1− p0)Pθ2(τ > T )
[
Eθ2 [
∫ T
0 re
−rtdY 1B(t)|τ > T ] + Eθ2 [
∫∞
T re
−rtsdt|τ > T ]
]
.
By Eqs. (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20), this expression is equal to
µ1p0(1− Pθ1(τ > T ))(1− Eθ1 [e−rτ |τ < T ])
+p0Pθ1(τ < T )H1
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0 f
θ1
(Bµ1 (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)re
−rtdtdx
+p0Pθ1(τ < T )
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
fθ1(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
1
ν¯1
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E+Gh+x)ν1(dh)dtdx
+µ1p0Pθ1(τ > T )(1− Eθ1 [e−rT |τ > T ]) + sp0Pθ1(τ > T )Eθ1[e−rT |τ > T ]
+µ2(1 − p0)Pθ2(τ > T ))(1− Eθ2 [e−rτ |τ < T ])
+(1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )H2
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0 f
θ2
(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)re
−rtdtdx
+(1−p0)Pθ2(τ < T )
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
1
ν¯2
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E+Gh+x)ν2(dh)dtdx
+µ2(1−p0)Pθ2(τ > T )(1−Eθ2[e−rT |τ > T ]+s(1−p0)Pθ2(τ > T )Eθ2 [e−rT |τ > T ].
By Eqs. (4.21), (4.22) and (4.23), this expression is equal to
µ1p0Pθ1(τ > T )
(
1− Pθ1 (τ
r>T )
Pθ1 (τ>T )
)
+ sp0Pθ1(τ > T )
Pθ1 (τ
r>T )
Pθ1(τ>T )
+p0(1− Pθ1(τ > T ))H1r · ν¯1ν¯1+r ·
1−Pθ1 (τr>T )
1−Pθ1 (τ>T )
+µ1p0(1 − Pθ1(τ > T ))
(
1− ν¯1ν¯1+r ·
1−Pθ1 (τr>T )
1−Pθ1 (τ>T )
)
+µ2(1 − p0)Pθ2(τ > T )
(
1− Pθ2 (τ
r>T )
Pθ2 (τ>T )
)
+ s(1− p0)Pθ2(τ > T )Pθ2(τ
r>T )
Pθ2 (τ>T )
+(1− p0)(1 − Pθ2(τ > T ))H2r · ν¯2ν¯2+r ·
1−Pθ2 (τr>T )
1−Pθ2 (τ>T )
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+µ2(1 − p0)(1− Pθ2(τ > T ))
(
1− ν¯1ν¯1+r ·
1−Pθ2(τr>T )
1−Pθ2 (τ>T )
)
+
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)·
·
[
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1 + (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν2(dh)/ν¯2
]
dtdx
= p0
(
µ1r
ν¯1+r
+ ν¯1H1rν¯1+r
)
+ (1 − p0)
(
µ2r
ν¯2+r
+ ν¯2H2rν¯2+r
)
+p0Pθ1(τ
r > T )
(
s− µ1rν¯1+r − ν¯1H1rν¯1+r
)
+ (1− p0)Pθ2(τr > T )
(
s− µ2rν¯2+r − ν¯2H2rν¯2+r
)
+
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)·
·
[
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1 + (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν2(dh)/ν¯2
]
dtdx
= p0
(
µ1r
ν¯1+r
+ ν¯1H1rν¯1+r
)
+ (1 − p0)
(
µ2r
ν¯2+r
+ ν¯2H2rν¯2+r
)
+p0e
−E(Fµ1+
√
2(ν¯1+r)+F 2µ1 )
(
s− µ1rν¯1+r − ν¯1H1rν¯1+r
)
+(1− p0)e−E(Fµ2+
√
2(ν¯2+r)+F 2µ2)
(
s− µ2rν¯2+r −
ν¯2H2r
ν¯2+r
)
+
∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)·
·
[
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1 + (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν2(dh)/ν¯2
]
dtdx.
Simplifying the last expression, the integral equation is
U(p,E) = Ap+B(1− p) + Cpe−m1E +D(1− p)e−m2E
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
∫
e−rtU(pt,h,x, E +Gh + x)g(x, t, h)dtdx,(IE)
where A,B,C, and D are constants, and
g(x, t, h) =
[
p0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ1(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν1(dh)/ν¯1(4.26)
+ (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ2(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)ν2(dh)/ν¯2
]
.
We show now that (IE) admits a unique solution U in the region [0, 1]× [0,∞).
Boundary values
First, we find the values of U(p,E) on the boundary of the region [0, 1] × [0,∞].
Note that U(p, 0) = s, and U(p,∞) = pg1 + (1− p)g2 for every p ∈ [0, 1], .
We now argue that there is a unique solution for (IE) when p = 0. U(0, E) is a
function of E with two boundary conditions, at E = 0 and at E =∞. Suppose that
U(0, E), V (0, E) solve (IE). ThenW (0, E) := U(0, E)−V (0, E) satisfiesW (0, E) =∫∞
−E
∫∞
0
∫
e−rtW (0, E +Gh + x)g(x, t, h)dtdx, and W (0, 0) = W (0,∞) = 0. Let Eˆ
be a critical point, where W achieves its maximum. Assume to the contrary that
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W (0, Eˆ) > 0. By (4.23) it follows that
∫∞
−Eˆ
∫∞
0
∫
e−rtg(x, t, h) < 1. Therefore,
W (0, Eˆ) =
∫ ∞
−Eˆ
∫ ∞
0
∫
e−rtW (0, Eˆ +Gh + x)g(x, t, h)
≤W (0, Eˆ)
∫ ∞
−Eˆ
∫ ∞
0
∫
e−rtg(x, t, h) < W (0, Eˆ),
which implies that W (0, E) ≤ 0. Similarly, one can obtain that W (0, E) ≥ 0, so
that W (0, E) ≡ 0, and the solution is unique.
Similar arguments show that (IE) admits a unique solution on [0,∞) when p = 1.
Since U(p,E) is uniquely determined on the boundary of the region [0, 1] ×
[0,∞], similar arguments show the uniqueness of the solution [0, 1]× [0,∞). Using
Eqs. (4.16) - (4.24) one can verify that the solution for (IE) is
U(p0, E) = p0g1+(1−p0)g2+(s−g1)p0e−(µ˜1−µ˜2)(α+1)E+(s−g2)(1−p0)e−(µ˜1−µ˜2)αE .
By substituting E := σµ1−µ2 ×
[
ln
(
q0
1−q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1−p′
)]
, we get Eq. (2.7), as
desired. 
4.5. Information Pricing.
Lemma 4.6. Let fa,b(η) be the function defined in (2.8). The equation fa,b(η) = 0
admits a unique solution in the interval (0,∞).
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4, and therefore omitted. We turn
to the proof of Theorem 2.6, which is analogous to the proof of Theorems 2.3 and
2.5.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Suppose that until time t, the DM chose the risky arm,
and observed the jumps ha1 , ...h
a
n (resp. h
b
1, ...h
b
m) from the process (X
a(t)) (resp.
(Xb(t))). Let Y aB(t) (resp. Y
b
B(t)) be the Brownian motion with drift component
of (Xa(t)) (resp. (Xb(t))) at time t. Note that Y jB(t) ∼ N(µjt, (σj)2t), j ∈ {a, b}.
Let qt := Pt(θ1|h1, ...hn; hb1, ...hbm; Y aB(t); Y bB(t); q0) be the posterior belief of the
DM. The odd ratio of the posterior belief is
qt
1− qt =
q0
1√
2πtσa
e
− (Y
a
B
(t)−µa1 t)
2
2(σa)2t 1√
2πtσb
e
− (Y
b
B
(t)−µb1t)
2
2(σb)2t e−ν¯
a
1 t
∏
t− ν
a
1 (dh
a
j )e
−ν¯b1t∏
t− ν
b
1(dh
b
j)
(1 − q0) 1√2πt(σa)e
− (Y
a
B
(t)−µa
2
t)2
2(σb)2t 1√
2πt(σb)
e
− (Y
b
B
(t)−µa
2
t)2
2(σb)2t e−ν¯a2 t
∏
t− ν
a
2 (dh
a
j )e
−ν¯b2t
∏
t− ν
b
2(dh
b
j)
(4.27)
=
q0e
µa1Y
a
B (t)/(σ
a)2−(µa1 )2t/2(σa)2eµ
b
1Y
b
B(t)/(σ
b)2−(µb1)2t/2(σb)2e−ν¯
a
1 t
∏
t− ν
a
1 (dh
a
j )e
−ν¯b1t∏
t− ν
b
1(dh
b
j)
(1 − q0)eµa2Y aB (t)/σ2−(µa2 )2t/2(σa)2eµb2Y bB(t)/σ2−(µb2)2t/2(σb)2e−ν¯a2 t
∏
t− ν
a
2 (dh
a
j )e
−ν¯b2t
∏
t− ν
b
2(dh
b
j)
.
Indeed, 1√
2πtσa
e
− (Y
a
B
(t)−µa1 t)
2
2(σa)2t (resp. 1√
2πtσb
e
− (Y
b
B(t)−µ
b
1t)
2
2(σb)2t ) is the probability of
observing Y aB(t) (resp. Y
b
B(t)), given the type θi, and e
−ν¯ai t (ν¯
a
i t)
n
n!
∏
t−
νai (dh
a
j )
ν¯ai
(resp.
e−ν¯
b
i t (ν¯
b
i t)
m
m!
∏
t−
νbi (dh
b
j)
ν¯bi
) is the probability of receiving the n (resp. m) jumps that
occurred until time t from (Xai (t)) (resp. (X
b
i (t))), given the type θi. The first
equality in (4.27) is the Bayesian belief updating, using the independence of the
Le´vy processes Xai (t) and X
b
i (t), and the independence of the components in the
Le´vy-Ito decomposition, given the type of the risky arm, and the second equality
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is obtained by eliminating common components.
Suppose the DM follows a cut-off strategy κ′ with cut-off point p′. If q0 ≤ p′,
the DM will always choose the safe arm. If q0 > p
′ the DM will initially choose
the risky arm. Then the DM chooses the risky arm as long as qt > p
′, which, by
Eq. (2.4), is equivalent to
q0
1− q0 ×
eµ
a
1Y
a
B(t)/(σ
a)2−(µa1 )2t/2(σa)2−ν¯a1 t
eµ
a
2Y
a
B
(t)/(σa)2−(µa2 )2t/2(σa)2−ν¯a2 t
× e
µb1Y
b
B(t)/(σ
b)2−(µb1)2t/2(σb)2−ν¯b1t
eµ
b
2Y
b
B(t)/(σ
b)2−(µb2)2t/2(σb)2−ν¯b2t
(4.28)
×
∏
t−
νa1 (dh
a)
νa2 (dh
a)
×
∏
t−
νb1(dh
b)
νb2(dh
b)
>
p′
1− p′ .
By taking the natural logarithm, and rearranging the resulting terms, we obtain
that this inequality is equivalent to
(
µa1 − µa2
σa
)
Y aB(t) +
(
µb1 − µb2
σb
)
Y bB(t) >
(4.29)
(
(µa1)
2 − (µa2)2
2(σa)2
+
(µb1)
2 − (µb2)2
2(σb)2
+ ν¯a1 + ν¯
b
1 − ν¯a2 − ν¯b2
)
t
−
(
ln
(
q0
1− q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1− p′
))
−
∑
t−
ln
(
νa1 (dh
a
j )
νa2 (dh
a
j )
)
−
∑
t−
ln
(
νb1(dh
b
j)
νb2(dh
b
j)
)
.
Since Y jB(t) = µ
a + σaZa(t), k ∈ {a, b}, it follows that Eq. (4.29) is equivalent to
Bµ˜
a,µ˜b(t) : =
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)Za(t) + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)Zb(t)√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
+
[
−(ν¯a1 + ν¯b1 − ν¯a2 − ν¯b2)t√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
(4.30)
+
2µ˜a(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)− ((µ˜a1)2 − (µ˜a2)2) + 2µ˜b(µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)− ((µ˜b1)2 − (µ˜b2)2)
2
√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
]
t
>
−
(
ln
(
q0
1−q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1−p′
))
−∑t− ln(νa1 (dhaj )νa2 (dhaj )
)
−∑t− ln
(
νb1(dh
b
j)
νb2(dh
b
j)
)
√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
,
where µ˜ji =
µji
σj , for j ∈ {a, b, c}, and i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice that Bµ˜
a,µ˜b(t) is a standard
Brownian motion with drift:
F µ˜
a,µ˜b : =
[
−(ν¯a1 + ν¯b1 − ν¯a2 − ν¯b2)t√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
+
2µ˜a(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)− ((µ˜a1)2 − (µ˜a2)2) + 2µ˜b(µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)− ((µ˜b1)2 − (µ˜b2)2)
2
√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
]
.
We construct an integral equation similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 2.5.
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Let τ be the stopping time of the first jump from the process (Xa(t) +Xb(t)).
Let the stopping time T be the first time t that satisfies
Bµ˜
a,µ˜b(t) ≤
−
(
ln
(
q0
1−q0
)
− ln
(
p′
1−p′
))
−∑t− ln(νa1 (dhaj )νa2 (dhaj )
)
−∑t− ln
(
νb1(dh
b
j)
νb2(dh
b
j)
)
√
(µ˜a1 − µ˜a2)2 + (µ˜b1 − µ˜b2)2
.
(4.31)
Denote Gah :=
ln
„
νa1 (dh
a
j )
νa2 (dh
a
j
)
«
√
(µ˜a1−µ˜a2 )2+(µ˜b1−µ˜b2)2
(resp. Gbh :=
ln
„
νb1(dh
b
j)
νb2(dh
b
j
)
«
√
(µ˜a1−µ˜a2 )2+(µ˜b1−µ˜b2)2
) the contri-
bution of a jump of size ha (resp. ha) received from the processXa(t) (resp. Xa(t)),
and E :=
−
“
ln
“
q0
1−q0
”
−ln
“
p′
1−p′
””
√
(µ˜a1−µ˜a2 )2+(µ˜b1−µ˜b2)2
, the intercept of the right-hand side of Eq. (4.30)
at t = 0.
Constructing the integral equation. The DM chooses the risky arm, until
the minimum between the stopping time of the first jump τ and the stopping time
T . We distinguish between two cases. In case the DM stops before the time of
the first jump τ , we calculate the expected discounted payoff from the process
(Xa(t) + Xc(t)) until the stopping time T , and the expected discounted payoff
from the safe arm after the stopping time T . In case the first jump occurs before
the stopping time T , we calculate the expected discounted payoff received from
the process (Xa(t) +Xc(t)) until time τ . If the first jump was received from the
process (Xa(t)), we add the expected discounted payoff from the first jump, and
the expected discounted continuation payoff, updating both the posterior pat,ha,x,
and the intercept E + Gah + x, according to the time of the first jump, the first
jump’s size, and the value of the continuous part of the process (Xa(t) + Xb(t));
while if the first jump was received from the process (Xb(t)), we add only the
expected discounted continuation payoff, updating both the posterior pbt,hb,x, and
the intercept E +Gbh + x, according to the time of the first jump, the first jump’s
size, and the value of the continuous part of the process (Xa(t) +Xb(t)).
The posterior pjt,hj,x is updated as follows:
pjt,hj,x := P (θ1|τ < T, τ = t, Bµ˜
a
1 ,µ˜
a
2 (τ) ∈ dx, hj)
=
P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ˜
a,µ˜b(τ) ∈ dx, hj |θ1)P (θ1)
P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ˜a,µ˜b(τ) ∈ dx, hj |θ1)P (θ1) + P (τ < T, τ = t, Bµ˜a,µ˜b(τ) ∈ dx, hj |θ2)P (θ2)
=
q0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b(τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
νj1(dh
j)
ν¯j1
q0Pθ1(τ < T )f
θ1
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
νj1(dh
j)
ν¯j1
+ (1 − q0)Pθ2(τ < T )fθ2(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)
νj2(dh
j)
ν¯j2
.
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The integral equation is as follows:
U(p0, E) = p0Pθ1(τ < T )
[
Eθ1
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY aB(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
]
+ Eθ1
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
](4.32)
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ1
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)re
−rt ν¯
a
1H
a
1
ν¯a1 + ν¯
b
1
dtdx
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ1
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−rt
∫
h
U(pat,ha,x, E +G
a
h + x)
(
νa1 (dh
a)
ν¯a1 + ν¯
b
1
)
dtdx
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ1
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−rt
∫
h
U(pbt,hb,x, E +G
b
h + x)
(
νb1(dh
b)
ν¯a1 + ν¯
b
1
)
dtdx
]
+ p0Pθ1(τ > T )
[
Eθ1
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY aB(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
+ Eθ1
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
+Eθ1
[∫ ∞
T
re−rtsdt
∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]]
+ (1− p0)Pθ2(τ < T )
[
Eθ2
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY aB(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
]
+ Eθ2
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
]
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ2
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)re
−rt ν¯
a
2H
a
2
ν¯a2 + ν¯
b
2
dtdx
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ2
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−rt
∫
h
U(pat,ha,x, E +G
a
h + x)
(
νa2 (dh
a)
ν¯a2 + ν¯
b
2
)
dtdx
+
∫ ∞
−E
∫ ∞
0
fθ2
(Bµ˜a,µ˜b (τ),τ)|τ<T (x, t)e
−rt
∫
h
U(pbt,hb,x, E +G
b
h + x)
(
νb2(dh
b)
ν¯a2 + ν¯
b
2
)
dtdx
]
+ (1− p0)Pθ2(τ > T )
[
Eθ2
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY aB(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
+ Eθ2
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
+Eθ2
[∫ ∞
T
re−rtsdt
∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]]
.
Similarly to Eqs. (4.19) and (4.20), using the stochastic integral properties for Le´vy
processes, it follows that for i ∈ {1, 2}
Eθi
[∫ T
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ τ > T
]
= gci
(
1− Eθ[e−rT |τ > T ]
)
,
and
Eθi
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdY c(t)
∣∣∣∣ τ < T
]
= gci
(
1− Eθ[e−rτ |τ < T ]
)
.
By these equations, and Eqs. (4.17)- (4.24), one can verify that for every q0 > p
′,
the unique solution of Eq. (4.32) is
U(p0, E) = (s− ga1 − gc1)p0e−(β+1)
√
(µ˜a1−µ˜a2 )2+(µ˜b1−µ˜b2)2E
+ (s− ga2 − gc2)(1 − p0)e−β
√
(µ˜a1−µ˜a2)2+(µ˜b1−µ˜b2)2E
+ p0(g
a
1 + g
c
1) + (1 − p0)(ga2 + gc2).
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Therefore, for every q0 > p
′, the expected discounted payoff is
Vp′(p0, q0) = (s− ga1 − gc1)p0
(
1− q0
q0
)β+1(
p′
1− p′
)β+1
+ (s− ga2 − gc2)(1− p0)
(
1− q0
q0
)β (
p′
1− p′
)β
+ p0(g
a
1 + g
c
1) + (1− p0)(ga2 + gc2),
as desired.
Now, if q0 = p0, using the same method to that used to prove Theorem 2.3, one
can show that the optimal cut-off strategy is
p∗ =
β(s− ga2 − gc2)
(β + 1)(ga1 + g
c
1 − s) + β(s− ga2 − gc2)
.

Proof of Corollary 2.7. Let βa be the unique solution of
fa(η) : =
∫
νa2 (dh
a)
(
νa2 (dh
a)
νa1 (dh
a)
)η
+ η(ν¯a1 − ν¯a2 )− ν¯a2 +
1
2
(η + 1)η
(
µa1 − µa2
σa
)2
− r = 0
in (0,∞), and let βa,b be the unique solution of Eq. (2.8). Using similar arguments
to those used to prove Lemma 4.4, one can show that βa,b < βa. Let p
∗
a,c =
βa(s−ga2−gc2)
(βa+1)(ga1+g
c
1−s)+βa(s−ga2−gc2) be the optimal cut-off of DM2. By Theorem 2.6, the
optimal expected payoff of DM2 is given by
UDM2(p0) = V
a,c
p∗a,c
(p0, p0)
=
{
s if p0 ≤ p∗a,c,
p0(g
a
1 + g
c
1) + (1 − p0)(ga2 + gc2) + Cβa(1− p0)(1−p0p0 )βa if p0 > p∗a,c,
where Cβa =
s−ga2−gc2−p∗a,c(ga1−gc1−ga2−gc2)
(1−p∗a,c)
„
1−p∗a,c
p∗a,c
«βa .
By Theorem 2.6, the expected payoff of DM1, using the same cut-off point p∗a,c
is given by
V a,b,cp∗a,c (p0, p0) =
{
s if p0 ≤ p∗a,c,
p0(g
a
1 + g
c
1) + (1− p0)(ga2 + gc2) + Cβa,b(1− p0)(1−p0p0 )βa,b if p0 > p∗a,c,
where Cβa,b =
s−ga2−gc2−p∗a,c(ga1−gc1−ga2−gc2)
(1−p∗a,c)
„
1−p∗a,c
p∗a,c
«βa,b .
Since βa,b < βa, it follows that if p0 > p
∗
a,c, then UDM2(p0) = V
a,c
p∗a,c
(p0, p0) <
V a,b,cp∗a,c (p0, p0) ≤ UDM1(p0), as desired.

4.6. Optimism vs Pessimism.
Proof of Theorem 2.8. Substituting q0 = p0 + ǫ in Eq. (2.7) yields
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Vp0(ǫ) = p0g1 + (1 − p0)g2 + p0(s− g1)
(
p∗
1− p∗
)α+1(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α+1
+ (1− p0)(s− g2)
(
p∗
1− p∗
)α(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α
,
where α is the unique solution of (2.2) in (0,∞).
Simple algebraic manipulations yield
Vp0(ǫ) = p0g1 + (1− p0)g2 + p0(s− g1)
(
p∗
1− p∗
)α+1(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α+1
+(1− p0)(s− g2)
(
p∗
1− p∗
)α(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α
= [p0g1 + (1− p0)g2] +
(
p∗
1− p∗
)α
·
·
[
p0(s− g1) p
∗
1− p∗
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α+1
+ (1− p0)(s− g2)
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α]
= [p0g1 + (1− p0)g2] +
(
α
α+ 1
)α(
s− g2
g1 − s
)α
·
·
[
−p0(s− g2) α
α+ 1
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α+1
+ (1− p0)(s− g2)
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α]
= [p0g1 + (1− p0)g2] +
(
α
α+ 1
)α(
s− g2
g1 − s
)α
1
p0(s− g2) ·
·
[
− α
α+ 1
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α+1
+
1− p0
p0
(
1− p0 − ǫ
p0 + ǫ
)α]
.
For every x ≥ 0 define W (x) = Vp(x)− Vp(−x). This is the difference between the
payoff of an optimist and the payoff of a pessimist. Straightforward calculations
show that
W ′(x) =
αx
p
[
−
(
1− (p+ x)
p+ x
)α
1
(p+ x)2(1 − (p+ x)) +
(
1− (p− x)
p− x
)α
1
(p− x)2(1− (p− x))
]
,
so that W (0) = W ′(0) = 0. Suppose α > 1. Since 1(p+x)3 <
1
(p−x)3 , and(
1−(p+x)
p+x
)α−1
<
(
1−(p−x)
p−x
)α−1
, we get W ′(x) > 0 for every x > 0 such that
p∗ < p± x ≤ 1, and so W (x) > 0; an optimist will fare better.
If 0 < α < 1, it is easy to verify that p∗ < α+23 . Since the function
(
1−y
y
)α
1
y2(1−y)
decreases for 0 < y < α+23 and increases for
α+2
3 < y < 1, it follows that for every
x > 0 such that p∗ < p± x ≤ α+23 we get W ′(x) > 0; an optimist will fare better,
and for every x > 0 such that α+23 < p± x we get W ′(x) < 0, and so W (x) < 0; a
pessimist will fare better. 
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5. Figures
In Figure 1 we depict a generic path of the Le´vy payoff process (Y (t)). The
contribution of the compound Poisson process (the jumps) appears in Figure 2.
The posterior belief given the observations appears in Figure 3. Finally, Figure 4
shows the time-dependent cut-off, as well as the continuous part of the process (the
Brownian motion with drift).
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Figure 1. The payoff process
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Figure 3. The posterior process
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References
1. Applebaum D.(2004) Le´vy Processes and Stochastic Calculus. Cambridge.
2. Babcock L. and Loewenstein G. (1997) Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 109-126.
3. Baumhart R. (1968) An Honest Profit. Prentice Hall.
BANDIT PROBLEMS WITH LE´VY PAYOFF PROCESSES 37
4. Bergemann D. and Va¨lima¨ki J. (2006). Bandit Problems. HECER discussion paper number 93.
5. Berry D. A. and Fristedt, B. (1985). Bandit Problems: Sequential Allocation of Experiments.
Chapman and Hall, New York.
6. Bertoin J. (1996) Le´vy Processes. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
7. Besanko D. and Wu J. (2008) The Impact of Market Structure on R&D Competition with
Learning. Preprint.
8. Bolton P. and Harris C. (1999) Strategic Experimentation. Econometrica, 67, 349-374.
9. Borodin A.N. and Salminen P. (1996) Handbook of Brownian motion - facts and formulae.
Basel, Birkhauser.
10. Camerer C.F. and Lovallo D. (1999) Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach. The American Economic Review, 89, 306-318.
11. Carr P. and Wu L. (2004) Time-Changed Le´vy Processes and Option Pricing. Journal of
Financial Economics, 71, 113-141.
12. Cohen A. and Solan E. (2004) Two armed Le´vy bandit with infinite Le´vy measure, preprint.
13. Cross P. (1977) Not can, But will College Teaching be Improved? New Directions for Higher
Education, 17, 1-15.
14. Friedman A. (1969) Partial Differential Equations, Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
15. Geman H., Madan D. and Yor M. (2001) Time Changes for Le´vy Processes. Mathematical
Finance, 17, 79-96.
16. Gittins J.C. and Jones D.M (1979) A Dynamic Allocation Index for the Discounted Multi-
armed Bandit Problem. Biometrika, 66, 561-565.
17. Heifetz A., Shannon C. and Spiegel Y. (2007) The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences. Eco-
nomic Theory, 32, 251-286.
18. Karatzas I. (1984) Gittins indices in the dynamic allocation problem for diffusion processes.
Annals of Probability, 12, 173-192.
19. Kaspi H. and Mandelbaum.A (1995) Le´vy Bandits: Multi-Armed Bandits Driven by Le´vy
Processes. Ann. Appl. Probab., 5, 541-565.
20. Keller G., Rady S. and Cripps M. (2005) Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits.
Econometrica, 73, 39-68.
21. Klein N. and Rady S. (2008) Negatively Correlated Bandits, under revision.
22. Larwood L. and Whittaker W. (1977) Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in Organiza-
tional Planning. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 194-198.
23. Moscarini G. and Squintani F. (2004) Competitive Experimentation with Private Information.
Cowles Foundation DP 1489.
24. Roberts K. and Weitzman M.L. (1981) Funding Criteria for Research, Development, and
Exploration Projects. Econometrica, 49, 1261-1288.
25. Rothschild M. (1974) A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing. Journal of Economic
Theory, 9, 185-202.
26. Svenson O. (1981) Are We all Less Risky and More Skillful than our Fellow Drivers? Acta
Psychologica, 47, 143-148.
27. Weinstein N.D. (1980) Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.
28. Weitzman M.L. (1979) Optimal Search for the Best Alternative. Econometrica, 47, 641-654.
